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Abstract What ethical criterion for intergenerational justice should be adopted, e.g.,
when faced with the task of managing the global environment? Koopmans’ axiomat-
ization of discounted utilitarianism is based on seemingly compelling conditions, yet
this criterion leads to hard-to-justify outcomes. The present analysis considers a class
of sustainable recursive social welfare functions within Koopmans’ general frame-
work. This class is axiomatized by means of a weak equity condition (“Hammond
Equity for the Future”) and general existence is established. Any member of the class
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satisfies the key axioms of Chichilnisky’s “sustainable preferences”. The analysis
singles out one of Koopmans’ original separability conditions (his Postulate 3′a), here
called “Independent Present”, as particularly questionable from an ethical perspective.
Keywords Intergenerational justice · Sustainability · Discounted utilitarianism
JEL Classification D63 · D71 · Q01
1 Introduction
How should we treat future generations? From a normative point of view, what are
the present generation’s obligations towards the future? What ethical criterion for
intergenerational justice should be adopted if one seeks to respect the interests of
future generations? Answering such questions is essential when faced with the task of
managing the global environment, e.g., in the context of climate change.1
These questions can be approached and answered in at least two ways:
1. Through an axiomatic analysis one can investigate on what ethical conditions var-
ious criteria for intergenerational justice are based and then proceed to evaluate
the normative appeal of these conditions.
2. By considering different technological environments, one can explore the conse-
quences of various criteria for intergenerational justice, and compare the properties
of the intergenerational well-being streams that are generated.
It is consistent with Rawls (1971) reflective equilibrium to do both: criteria for inter-
generational justice should be judged both by the ethical conditions on which they build
and by their consequences in specific technological environments. In particular, we
may question the appropriateness of a criterion for intergenerational justice if it pro-
duces unacceptable outcomes in relevant technological environments. This view has
been supported by many scholars, including Koopmans (1967), Dasgupta and Heal
(1979, p. 311), and Atkinson (2001, p. 206).
When evaluating long-term policies, economists usually suggest to maximize the
sum of discounted utilities. On the one hand, such discounted utilitarianism has been
given a solid axiomatic foundation by Koopmans (1960).2 On the other hand, this crite-
rion has ethically questionable implications when applied to economic models with re-
source constraints. This is demonstrated by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) in the so-called
Dasgupta–Heal–Solow (DHS) model of capital accumulation and resource depletion
(Dasgupta and Heal 1974, 1979; Solow 1974), where discounted utilitarianism for any
1 A separate set of important questions relates to how to implement policies that are designed to respect the
interests of future generations and to assess their effectiveness; see, e.g., in the context of climate change,
Burniaux and Martins (2010), Dutta and Radner (2010), Karp and Zhang (2010) and Ostrom (2010). In this
context it is also of interest to investigate the validity of the ‘Coase theorem’, as done by Chipman and Tian
(2010). Moreover, as pointed out by Lecocq and Hourcade (2010), optimal policies may require estimates
of future intragenerational distribution. Finally, as illustrated by Rezai et al. (2010), in some cases, such
policies may benefit all generations, and thus do not represent a question of intergenerational justice.
2 For an alternative set of axioms leading to discounted utilitarianism, see Lauwers (1997).
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positive discount rate undermines the well-being of generations in far future, even if
sustainable streams with non-decreasing well-being are feasible.
In this paper we revisit Koopmans framework, with numerical representability,
sensitivity, and stationarity as its key features. In Sect. 2 we consider conditions
that are sufficient to numerically represent the social welfare relation by means of
a recursive social welfare function satisfying sensitivity, stationarity, and a condition
requiring that the evaluation of two streams with the same present well-being not
depend on what that level of well-being is, thereby echoing the analysis of Koop-
mans (1960, Sects. 3–7). In this framework we introduce an equity condition we call
“Hammond Equity for the Future”, capturing the following ethical intuition: A sac-
rifice by the present generation leading to a uniform gain for all future generations
cannot lead to a less desirable stream of well-being if the present remains better-off
than the future even after the sacrifice.3
In Sect. 3 we point out that “Hammond Equity for the Future” is weak, as it is
implied by all the standard consequentialist equity conditions suggested in the litera-
ture. We show that adding this condition leads to a class of sustainable recursive social
welfare functions, where the well-being of the present generation is taken into account
if and only if the future is better-off. Furthermore, we establish general existence by
means of an algorithmic construction. Finally, we show that any member of this class
of sustainable recursive social welfare functions satisfies the key axioms of Chichilni-
sky (1996) “sustainable preferences”, namely “No Dictatorship of the Present” and
“No Dictatorship of the Future”.4
In Sect. 4 we offer results that identify which of the conditions used by Koopmans
(1960) to axiomatize discounted utilitarianism is particularly questionable from an
ethical perspective. The condition in question, referred to as “Independent Present”
by us and listed as Postulate 3′a by Koopmans (1960, Sect. 14), requires that the
evaluation of two streams which differ during only the first two periods not depend
on what the common continuation stream is. It is only by means of “Independent
Present” that Koopmans (1960, Sect. 14) moves beyond the recursive form to arrive
at discounted utilitarianism, since this condition allows for additively separable rep-
resentations when combined with stationarity and the requirement that the evaluation
of two streams with the same present well-being not depend on what that level of
well-being is (Debreu 1960; Gorman 1968a; Koopmans 1986a).
We suggest in Sect. 4 that “Independent Present”—which in the words of Heal
(2005) is “restrictive” and “surely not innocent”—may not be supported by ethical
intuition, as it is not obvious that the resolution of a conflict between the first two gen-
erations should be independent of how their well-being compares to the well-being
of later generations. In our formal analysis, we single out “Independent Present” as
the culprit by showing that the addition of this condition contradicts both “Hammond
Equity for the Future” and the Chichilnisky (1996) conditions.
In Sect. 5 we apply sustainable recursive social welfare functions for studying opti-
mal harvesting of a renewable resource that yields amenities. In a companion paper
3 Our condition is inspired from Hammond (1976) Equity condition, but—as we will see—it is weaker and
has not only an egalitarian justification.
4 See Chichilnisky (2010) for an analysis of markets where traders have “sustainable preferences”.
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(Asheim and Mitra 2010) it is demonstrated how such functions can be used to solve
the distributional conflicts in the DHS model. In both settings, our new criterion yields
consequences that differ from those of discounted utilitarianism.
Koopmans (1960) has often been interpreted as presenting the definitive case for
discounted utilitarianism. In Sect. 6 we discuss how our results contribute to a weak-
ening of this impression, by exploring other avenues within the general setting of
his approach. We also investigate the scope for our new equity condition “Hammond
Equity for the Future” outside the Koopmans framework by not imposing that the
social welfare relation is numerically representable.
All lemmas and proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Formal setting and basic result
Let R denote the set of real numbers and Z+ the set of non-negative integers. Denote
by 0x = (x0, x1, . . . , xt , . . . , ) an infinite stream, where xt ∈ Y is a one-dimensional
indicator of the well-being of generation t , and Y ⊆ R is a non-degenerate interval
of admissible well-beings.5 We will consider the set X of infinite streams bounded in
well-being (see Koopmans 1986b, p. 89); i.e., X is given by
X = {0x ∈ RZ+ | [inf t xt , supt xt ] ⊆ Y }.
By setting Y = [0, 1], this includes the important special case where X = [0, 1]Z+ .
However, the formulation allows for cases where Y is not compact.
Denote by 0xT−1 = (x0, x1, . . . , xT−1) and T x = (xT , xT+1, . . . , xT+t , . . . , ) the
T -head and the T -tail of 0x. Write conz = (z, z, . . . ) for the stream of a constant level
of well-being equal to z ∈ Y . Throughout this paper we assume that the indicator of
well-being is at least ordinally measurable and level comparable across generations;
Blackorby et al. (1984) call this “level-plus comparability”.
For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, we write 0x ≥ 0y if and only if xt ≥ yt for all t ∈ Z+, 0x > 0y
if and only if 0x ≥ 0y and 0x = 0y, and 0x  0y if and only if xt > yt for all
t ∈ Z+.
A social welfare relation (swr) is a binary relation  on X, where for all 0x, 0y ∈
X, 0x  0y stands for (0x, 0y) ∈  and entails that 0x is deemed socially at least
as good as 0y. Denote by ∼ and 	 the symmetric and asymmetric parts of ; i.e.,
0x ∼ 0y is equivalent to 0x  0y and 0y  0x and entails that 0x is deemed socially
indifferent to 0y, while 0x 	 0y is equivalent to 0x  0y and 0y / 0x and entails
that 0x is deemed socially preferred to 0y.
All comparisons are made at time 0. We abuse notation slightly by writing, for
T, T ′ ≥ 0, T x and T ′y when referring to 0x′ and 0y′ where for all t, x ′t = xT+t and
y′t = yT ′+t . This notational convention allows us to write T x, T ′y ∈ X and T x  T ′y.
5 A more general framework is, as used by Koopmans (1960), to assume that the well-being of generation t
depends on an n-dimensional vector xt that takes on values in a connected set Y. However, by representing
the well-being of generation t by a scalar xt , we can focus on intergenerational issues. In doing so, we
follow, e.g., Diamond (1965), Svensson (1980), Chichilnisky (1996), Basu and Mitra (2003) and Bossert
et al. (2007).
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It is used throughout the paper, e.g., in the definition of condition IF, in the statement
of Lemma 2, and in the proofs of Proposition 2 and Lemma 3.
A social welfare function (swf) representing  is a mapping W : X → R with the
property that for all 0x, 0y ∈ X, W (0x) ≥ W (0y) if and only if 0x  0y. A mapping
W : X → R is monotone if 0x ≥ 0y implies W (0x) ≥ W (0y).
In the present section, we impose conditions on the swr sufficient to obtain a numer-
ical representation in terms of an swf with a recursive structure (see Proposition 2
below), similar to, but not identical to Koopmans’ (1960, Sects. 3–7).
To obtain a numerical representation, we impose two conditions.
Condition O (Order)  is complete (for all 0x, 0y ∈ X, 0x  0y or 0y  0x) and
transitive (for all 0x, 0y, 0z ∈ X, 0x  0y and 0y  0z imply 0x  0z).
Condition RC (Restricted Continuity) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x satisfies xt = z for
all t ≥ 1, and the sequence of streams 〈0xn〉n∈N satisfies limn→∞ supt |xnt − xt | = 0
with, for each n ∈ N, 0xn ∈ X and 0xn ⊀ 0y (resp. 0xn  0y), then 0x ⊀ 0y
(resp. 0x  0y).
Condition RC is weaker than ordinary supnorm continuity as, under condition RC, the
stream 0x to which the sequence 〈0xn〉n∈N converges is restricted to having a constant
level of well-being from period 1 on.
Condition C (Continuity) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if the sequence of streams 〈0xn〉n∈N
satisfies limn→∞ supt |xnt − xt | = 0 with, for each n ∈ N, 0xn ∈ X and 0xn ⊀ 0y
(resp. 0xn  0y), then 0x ⊀ 0y (resp. 0x  0y).
Condition C is entailed by Koopmans (1960) Postulate 1. As the analysis of Sect. 3
shows, the weaker continuity condition RC enables us to show existence of sustainable
recursive social welfare functions.
The central condition in Koopmans (1960) analysis is the stationarity postulate
(Postulate 4). Combined with Koopmans’ Postulate 3b (the condition requiring that
the evaluation of two streams with the same present well-being not depend on what that
level of well-being is), the stationarity postulate is equivalent to the following inde-
pendence condition (where we borrow the name that Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) use
for a slightly stronger version of this condition).
Condition IF (Independent Future) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X with x0 = y0, 0x  0y if and
only if 1x  1y.
Condition IF means that an evaluation concerning only generations from the next
period on can be made as if the present time (time 0) was actually at time 1, i.e., as
if generations {0, 1, . . . } would have taken the place of generations {1, 2, . . . }. If we
extended our framework to also include comparisons at future times, then IF would
imply time consistency as long as the swr is time invariant.
With the well-being of each generation t expressed by a one-dimensional indicator
xt , it is uncontroversial to ensure through the following condition that a higher value
of xt cannot lead to a socially less preferred stream.
Condition M (Monotonicity) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x > 0y, then 0y  0x.
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Combined with the completeness part of condition O, it follows from condition M
that, for all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x ≥ 0y, then 0x  0y. Condition M is obviously implied
by the “Strong Pareto” condition.
Condition SP (Strong Pareto) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x > 0y, then 0x 	 0y.
With condition M we need not impose Koopmans (1960) extreme streams postulate
(Postulate 5) and can consider the set of infinite streams bounded in well-being.
As the fifth and final condition of our basic representation result (Proposition 2),
we impose the following efficiency condition:
Condition RD (Restricted Dominance) For all x, z ∈ Y , if x < z, then (x, conz) ≺
conz.
To evaluate the implications of RD, consider the following three conditions:
Condition WS (Weak Sensitivity) There exist 0x, 0y, 0z ∈ X such that (x0, 1z) 	
(y0, 1z).
Condition DF (Dictatorship of the Future) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X such that 0x 	 0y,
there exist y, y¯ ∈ Y , with y ≤ xt , yt ≤ y¯ for all t ∈ Z+, and T ′ ∈ Z+ such that, for
every 0z, 0v ∈ [y, y¯]Z+ , (0zT−1, T x) 	 (0vT−1, T y) for all T > T ′.
Condition NDF (No Dictatorship of the Future) Condition DF does not hold.
Condition SP implies condition RD, which in turn implies condition WS. Condition
WS coincides with Koopmans’ (1960) Postulate 2. Condition NDF generalizes one
of Chichilnisky’s (1996) two main axioms to our setting where we consider the set of
infinite streams bounded in well-being.
Proposition 1 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O and IF. Then WS is
equivalent to NDF.
As already noted at the end of the introduction, the proof of this and later results are
provided in an Appendix.
Since RD strengthens WS, it follows from Proposition 1 that RD ensures “No
Dictatorship of the Future”, provided that the swr satisfies conditions O and IF. To
appreciate why we cannot replace RD with an even stronger efficiency condition, we
refer to the analysis of Sect. 3 and the impossibility result of Proposition 4.
To state Proposition 2, we introduce the following notation:
U := {U : Y → R | U is continuous and non-decreasing;
U (Y ) is not a singleton}
UI := {U : Y → R | U is continuous and increasing}
V(U ) := {V : U (Y )2 → R | V satisfies (V.0), (V.1), (V.2), and (V.3)},
where for all U ∈ U , U (Y ) denotes the range of U , and the properties of the aggre-
gator function V , (V.0)–(V.3), are as follows:
(V.0) V (u, w) is continuous in (u, w) on U (Y )2.
(V.1) V (u, w) is non-decreasing in u for given w.
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(V.2) V (u, w) is increasing in w for given u.
(V.3) V (u, w) < w for u < w, and V (u, w) = w for u = w.
Proposition 2 The following two statements are equivalent:
(1) The swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD.
(2) There exists a monotone swf W : X → R representing  and satisfying, for
some U ∈ UI and V ∈ V(U ), W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and
W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y .
For a given representation W (with associated utility function U ) of an swr satis-
fying conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD, we refer to U (xt ) as the utility of generation
t and W (0x) as the welfare derived from the infinite stream 0x.
3 Hammond equity for the future
Discounted utilitarianism satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD. Hence, these
conditions do not by themselves prevent “Dictatorship of the Present”, in the termi-
nology of Chichilnisky (1996).
Condition DP (Dictatorship of the Present) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X such that 0x 	 0y,
there exist y, y¯ ∈ Y , with y ≤ xt , yt ≤ y¯ for all t ∈ Z+, and T ′ ∈ Z+ such that, for
any 0z, 0v ∈ [y, y¯]Z+ , (0xT−1, T z) 	 (0yT−1, T v) for all T > T ′.
Condition NDP (No Dictatorship of the Present) Condition DP does not hold.
Condition NDP generalizes the other of Chichilnisky’s (1996) two main axioms to
our setting where we consider the set of infinite streams bounded in well-being.
We impose a weak new equity condition that ensures NDP. Combined with RC,
this condition entails that the interest of the present are taken into account only if
the present is worse-off than the future. Consider a stream (x, conz) having the prop-
erty that well-being is constant from the second period on. For such a stream we
may unequivocally say that, if x < z, then the present is worse-off than the future.
Likewise, if x > z, then the present is better-off than the future.
Condition HEF (Hammond Equity for the Future) For all x, y, z, v ∈ Y , if x > y >
v > z, then (x, conz)  (y, conv).6
For streams where well-being is constant from the second period on, condition HEF
captures the idea of giving priority to an infinite number of future generations in the
choice between alternatives where the future is worse-off compared with the present
in both alternatives. If the present is better-off than the future and a sacrifice now leads
to a uniform gain for all future generations, then such a transfer from the present to the
future cannot lead to a less desirable stream, as long as the present remains better-off
than the future.
6 Condition HEF was introduced in a predecessor to this paper (Asheim and Tungodden 2004b) and has
been analyzed by Banerjee (2006), Asheim et al. (2007), Asheim and Mitra (2010), and Alcantud and
García-Sanz (2010).
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To appreciate the weakness of condition HEF, consider weak versions of the
standard “Hammond Equity” condition (Hammond 1976) and Lauwers (1998) non-
substitution condition.
Condition WHE (Weak Hammond Equity) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x and 0y satisfy
that there exists a pair τ ′, τ ′′ such that xτ ′ > yτ ′ > yτ ′′ > xτ ′′ and xt = yt for all
t = τ ′, τ ′′, then 0x  0y.7
Condition WNS (Weak Non-Substitution) For all x, y, z, v ∈ Y , if v > z, then
(x, conz)  (y, conv).
By assuming, in addition, that well-beings are at least cardinally measurable and
fully comparable, we may also consider weak versions of the Lorenz Domination
and Pigou–Dalton principles. Such equity conditions have been used in the setting of
infinite streams by, e.g., Birchenhall and Grout (1979), Asheim (1991), Fleurbaey and
Michel (2001), and Hara et al. (2008).
Condition WLD (Weak Lorenz Domination) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x and 0y are
such that 0yT−1 weakly Lorenz dominates 0xT−1 and T x = Ty for some T > 1, then
0x  0y.8
Condition WPD (Weak Pigou–Dalton) For all 0x, 0y ∈ X, if 0x and 0y are such that
there exist a positive number  and a pair τ ′, τ ′′ satisfying xτ ′ −  = yτ ′ ≥ yτ ′′ =
xτ ′′ +  and xt = yt for all t = τ ′, τ ′′, then 0x  0y.
While it is clear that condition HEF is implied by WNS, it is perhaps less obvious
that, under O and M, HEF is at least as weak as each of WHE, WPD, and WLD.
Proposition 3 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O and M. Then each of
WHE, WPD, and WLD implies HEF.
Note that condition HEF involves a comparison between a sacrifice by a single
generation and a uniform gain for each member of an infinite set of generations that
are worse-off. Hence, contrary to the standard “Hammond Equity” condition, if well-
beings are made (at least) cardinally measurable and fully comparable, then the transfer
from the better-off present to the worse-off future specified in condition HEF increases
the sum of well-beings for a sufficiently large number T of generations. This entails
that condition HEF is implied by both WPD and WLD, independently of what spe-
cific cardinal scale of well-beings is imposed (provided that conditions O and M are
satisfied). Hence, “Hammond Equity for the Future” can be endorsed from both an
egalitarian and utilitarian point of view. In particular, condition HEF is weaker and
more compelling than the standard “Hammond Equity” condition.
7 Under completeness, condition WHE corresponds to the standard “Hammond Equity” condition, where
the premise implies 0x  0y.




τ=0 xτ and (ii)





τ=0 xψ(τ) for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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However, in line with the Diamond–Yaari impossibility result (Diamond 1965) on
the inconsistency of equity and efficiency conditions under continuity,9 the equity
condition HEF is in conflict with the following weak efficiency condition under RC.
Condition RS (Restricted Sensitivity) There exist x, z ∈ Y with x > z such that
(x, conz) 	 conz.
Condition SP implies condition RS, which in turn implies condition WS.
Proposition 4 There is no swr  satisfying conditions RC, RS, and HEF.
Impossibility results arising from HEF are further explored in Asheim et al. (2007).
Here we concentrate on swrs that satisfy HEF. We note that it follows from Prop-
osition 4 that RD is the strongest efficiency condition compatible with HEF under
RC, when comparing streams (x, conz) where well-being is constant from the second
period on with constant streams conz.
The following result establishes that “Dictatorship of the Present” is indeed ruled
out by adding condition HEF to conditions O, RC, IF, and M.
Proposition 5 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, and M. Then
HEF implies NDP.
How does the basic representation result of Proposition 2 change if we also impose
condition HEF on an swr  satisfying conditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD? To inves-
tigate this question, introduce the following notation:
VS(U ) := {V : U (Y )2 → R | V satisfies (V.0), (V.1), (V.2), and (V.3′)},
where (V.3′) is given as follows:
(V.3′) V (u, w) < w for u < w, and V (u, w) = w for u ≥ w.
Note that, for each U ∈ U , VS(U ) ⊆ V(U ).
Proposition 6 The following two statements are equivalent:
(1) The swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF.
(2) There exists a monotone swf W : X → R representing  and satisfying, for
some U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ), W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and
W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y .
We refer to a mapping satisfying the property presented in statement (2) of Prop-
osition 6 as a sustainable recursive swf. Proposition 6 does not address the question
whether there exists a sustainable recursive swf for any U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ).
This question of existence is resolved through the following proposition, which also
characterizes the asymptotic properties of such social welfare functions:
9 The Diamond–Yaari impossibility result states that the equity condition of “Weak Anonymity” (deeming
two streams socially indifferent if one is obtained from the other through a finite permutation of well-beings)
is inconsistent with the efficiency condition SP given C. See also Basu and Mitra (2003) and Fleurbaey and
Michel (2003).
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Proposition 7 For all U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ), there exists a monotone mapping W :
X → R satisfying W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z)
for all z ∈ Y . Any such mapping W satisfies, for each 0x ∈ X,
limT→∞W (T x) = lim inf t→∞U (xt ).
By combining Propositions 6 and 7 we obtain our first main result.
Theorem 1 There exists a class of swrs  satisfying conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD,
and HEF.
The proof of the existence part of Proposition 7 is based on an algorithmic con-
struction. For any 0x ∈ X and each T ∈ Z+, consider the following finite sequence:
w(T, T ) = lim inf t→∞ U (xt )
w(T − 1, T ) = V (U (xT−1), w(T, T ))
· · ·





Define the mapping Wσ : X → R by
Wσ (0x) := limT→∞w(0, T ). (W)
In the proof of Proposition 7 we show that Wσ is a sustainable recursive swf.
It is an open question whether Wσ is the unique sustainable recursive swf given
U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ). As reported in the following proposition, we can show
uniqueness if the aggregator function satisfies a condition introduced by Koopmans
et al. (1964, p. 88): V ∈ V(U ) satisfies the property of weak time perspective if there
exists a continuous increasing transformation g : R → R such that g(w)−g(V (u, w))
is a non-decreasing function of w for given u.
Proposition 8 Let U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ). If V satisfies the property of weak time
perspective, then there exists a unique monotone mapping W : X → R satisfying
W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . This
mapping, Wσ , is defined by (W).
We have not been able to establish that the property of weak time perspective fol-
lows from the conditions we have imposed. However, it is satisfied in special cases,
e.g., with V given by
V (u, w) =
{
(1 − δ)u + δw if u < w
w if u ≥ w, (2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1).10 We can also show that the set of supnorm continuous sustainable
recursive swfs contains at most Wσ . However, even though Wσ is continuous in the
weak sense implied by condition RC, it need not be supnorm continuous.
10 Sustainable recursive swfs with aggregator function given by (2) are analyzed in the companion paper
(Asheim and Mitra 2010). Note that an swr  represented by such a sustainable recursive swf satisfies the
following restricted form of the IP condition introduced in the next section:
For all 0x, 0y, 0z, 0v ∈ X such that (x0, x1, 2z), (y0, y1, 2z), (x0, x1, 2v), (y0, y1, 2v) are non-
decreasing, (x0, x1, 2z)  (y0, y1, 2z) if and only if (x0, x1, 2v)  (y0, y1, 2v).
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Once we drop one of the conditions RC, IF, and RD, and combine the remaining
two conditions with O, M, and HEF, new possibilities open up. It is clear that
– The mapping W : X → R defined by W (0x) := lim inf t→∞U (xt ) for some
U ∈ UI represents an swr satisfying O, RC, IF, M, and HEF, but not RD.
– The maximin swr satisfies O, RC, M, RD, and HEF, but not IF.
– Leximin and undiscounted utilitarian swrs for infinite streams satisfy O, IF, M,
RD, and HEF, but not RC (cf. Proposition 13).
It follows from Propositions 1, 5, and 6 that any sustainable recursive swf represents
an swr satisfying NDF and NDP. Chichilnisky (1996, Definition 6) defines “sustain-
able preferences” by imposing NDF and NDP as well as numerical representability
and SP. When showing existence in her Theorem 1, she considers swrs violating
condition IF. Hence, through showing general existence for our sustainable recursive
swf, we demonstrate that NDF and NDP can be combined with (a) numerical repre-
sentability, (b) condition IF which implies stationarity, and (c) sensitivity to present
well-being—and thus be imposed within the Koopmans framework—provided that
SP is replaced by weaker dominance conditions.11
4 Independent present
The following condition is invoked as Postulate 3′a in Koopmans’ (1960) character-
ization of discounted utilitarianism:
Condition IP (Independent Present) For all 0x, 0y, 0z, 0v ∈ X, (x0, x1, 2z) 
(y0, y1, 2z) if and only if (x0, x1, 2v)  (y0, y1, 2v).
Condition IP requires that the evaluation of two streams differing only in the first
two periods not depend on what the common continuation stream is. We suggest in
this section that this condition may not be compelling, both through appeal to ethical
intuition, and through formal results.
We suggest that it might be supported by ethical intuition to accept that the stream
(1, 4, 5, 5, 5, . . . ) is socially better than (2, 2, 5, 5, 5, . . . ), while not accepting that
(1, 4, 2, 2, 2, . . . ) is socially better than (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, . . . ). It is not obvious that we
should treat the conflict between the worst-off and the second worst-off generation
presented by the first comparison in the same manner as we treat the conflict between
the worst-off and the best-off generation put forward by the second comparison.
Turn now to the formal results. Koopmans’ (1960) characterizes discounted utili-
tarianism by means of conditions IF, WS, and IP. However, it turns out that conditions
IF, WS, and IP contradict HEF under RC and M. Furthermore, this conclusion is
tight, in the sense that an swr exists if any one of these conditions is dropped. This is
our second main result.
11 Mitra (2008) shows by means of an example that “sustainable preferences” can be combined with IF in
the case where Y = [0, 1] if we are willing to give up RC. See also Lauwers (2010) where the constructibility
of Chichilnisky (1996) criterion is investigated.
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Theorem 2 There is no swr  satisfying conditions RC, IF, M, WS, HEF, and IP.
If one of the conditions RC, IF, M, WS, HEF, and IP is dropped, then there exists an
swr  satisfying the remaining five conditions as well as condition O.
In the following proposition, we reproduce Koopmans’ (1960) characterization of
discounted utilitarianism within the formal setting of this paper.12
Proposition 9 The following two statements are equivalent:
(1) The swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, WS, and IP.
(2) There exists a monotone swf W : X → R representing  and satisfying, for
some U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1), W (0x) = (1 − δ)U (x0) + δW (1x) for all 0x ∈ X.
Strengthening WS to RD in statement (1) is equivalent to replacing U by UI in state-
ment (2).
This proposition follows from standard results for additively separable representations
(Debreu 1960; Gorman 1968a; Koopmans 1986a), by exploiting the overlap of periods
that conditions IF and IP give rise to (cf. Lemma 3).
Furthermore, we note that the discounted utilitarian swf exists and is unique.
Proposition 10 For all U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a unique monotone map-
ping W : X → R satisfying W (0x) = (1 − δ)U (x0) + δW (1x) for all 0x ∈ X. This
mapping, Wδ , is defined by, for each 0x ∈ X,




Propositions 9 and 10 have the following implication:
Proposition 11 There is no swr  satisfying conditions O, RC, IF, M, IP, NDP,
and NDF.
To summarize, it follows from Theorem 2 and Propositions 1 and 11 that, within
a Koopmans framework where O, RC, IF, M, and WS are imposed, condition IP
contradicts both HEF and NDP. Hence, in such a framework, IP is in conflict with
consequentialist equity conditions that respect the interests of future generations.
5 Applying sustainable recursive SWFs
We apply sustainable recursive swfs for studying optimal harvesting of a renewable
resource where, following Krautkraemer (1985), well-being may be derived directly
from the resource stock. Using discounted utilitarianism in this setting reduces the
resource stock below the green golden-rule (defined below) and leads to resource
deterioration for sufficiently high discounting (Heal 1998).
12 See Bleichrodt et al. (2008) for a simplified characterization of discounted utilitarianism on an extended
domain, as well as an overview of related literature.
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Maximizing sustainable recursive swfs leads to very different conclusions, as re-
ported in Proposition 12. Before stating this result, we introduce the model.
The law of motion governing the bio-mass of the renewable resource, k, is given by
a standard increasing, concave stock-recruitment function, f , and therefore the pro-
duction framework is formally the same as the standard neoclassical aggregate model
of economic growth. The function f : R+ → R+ is assumed to satisfy
(i) f (0) = 0,
(ii) f is continuous, increasing and strictly concave on R+,
(iii) limk→0 f (k)k > 1 and limk→∞ f (k)k < 1.
It can be shown that there exists a unique number k¯ > 0 such that f (k¯) = k¯ and
f (k) > k for k ∈ (0, k¯).
A feasible path from k ∈ [0, k¯] is a sequence of resource stocks 0k satisfying
k0 = k, 0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ f (kt ) for t ≥ 0.
It follows from the definition of k¯ that kt ∈ [0, k¯] for t > 0. Hence, k¯ is the maximal
attainable resource stock if one starts from an initial stock in [0, k¯]. Associated with
a feasible path 0k from k ∈ [0, k¯] is a consumption stream 0c, defined by
ct = f (kt ) − kt+1 for t ≥ 0.
Well-being, x , depends on consumption and resource amenities through a function
x : [0, k¯]2 → R, which is assumed to satisfy:
(i) x is continuous and quasi-concave on [0, k¯]2,
(ii) x is non-decreasing in (c, k), and increasing in c (when k > 0). (3)
The set of admissible well-beings is given by Y := [x(0, 0), x(k¯, k¯)]. Associated with
a feasible path 0k from k ∈ [0, k¯] is a well-being stream 0x, defined by
xt = x( f (kt ) − kt+1, kt ) for t ≥ 0.
For any k ∈ [0, k¯], the set of well-being streams associated with feasible resource
paths from k is contained in X = Y Z+ .
It follows from the continuity and strict concavity of f and the continuity and
quasi-concavity of x , combined with property (3)(ii), that there exists a unique num-
ber k∗ ∈ [0, k¯] such that x( f (k∗)− k∗, k∗) ≥ x( f (k)− k, k) for all k ∈ [0, k¯]. Since,
for any k ∈ (0, k¯), x( f (k) − k, k) > x( f (0) − 0, 0) = x(0, 0), we have that k∗ > 0.
Clearly, an additional assumption can be imposed to ensure the existence of k ∈ (0, k¯)
such that x( f (k)− k, k) > x( f (k¯)− k¯, k¯) = x(0, k¯), so that k∗ < k¯. The subsequent
analysis holds with (and without) any such assumption.
We write c∗ := f (k∗)−k∗ and x∗ := x(c∗, k∗). By keeping the resource stock con-
stant at k∗, a maximum sustainable well-being equal to x∗ is attained; this corresponds
to the green golden-rule (Chichilnisky et al. 1995). The following result shows that if
k ∈ [k∗, k¯] and a sustainable recursive swf is maximized, then welfare corresponds to
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the green golden-rule, and the resource stock never falls below the green golden-rule
level.
Proposition 12 Assume that an economy maximizes a sustainable recursive swf W :
X → R on the set of well-being streams associated with feasible resource paths from
k ∈ [k∗, k¯]. Then an optimum exists, and for any optimal resource path 0kˆ, with
associated well-being stream 0xˆ,
W (t xˆ) = W (conx∗), xˆt ≥ x∗, and kˆt ≥ k∗ for t ≥ 0.
Hence, in contrast to the existence problem encountered when Chichilnisky’s (1996)
“sustainable preferences” are applied to such a setting (see Figuieres and Tidball 2010,
where this problem motivates an interesting analysis), optima exist when sustainable
recursive swfs are used to evaluate streams (at least, for k ∈ [k∗, k¯]). Moreover, in con-
trast to the outcome under discounted utilitarianism, sustainable recursive swfs sustain
well-being at or above its maximum sustainable level, by sustaining the resource stock
at or above the green golden-rule level.
In a companion paper (Asheim and Mitra 2010) it is demonstrated how sustainable
recursive swfs can be used to resolve in an appealing way the interesting distributional
conflicts that arise in the DHS model of capital accumulation and resource depletion.
In particular, applying sustainable recursive swfs in this setting leads to growth and
development at first when capital is productive, while protecting the generations in
the distant future from the grave consequences of discounting when the vanishing
resource stock undermines capital productivity.
6 Concluding remarks
Koopmans (1960) has often been interpreted as presenting the definitive case for dis-
counted utilitarianism. In Sects. 2 and 3 we have sought to weaken this impression by
exploring other avenues within the general setting of his approach. In particular, by not
imposing condition IP, used by Koopmans (1960) to characterize discounted utilitari-
anism, we have been able to combine our new equity condition HEF with the essential
features of the Koopmans framework: (a) numerical representability, (b) sensitivity to
the interests of the present generation, and (c) condition IF which includes Koopmans’
stationarity postulate. This leads to a non-empty class of sustainable recursive social
welfare functions. We have argued that condition HEF is weak, as it is implied by all
the standard consequentialist equity conditions suggested in the literature, yet strong
enough to ensure that the Chichilnisky (1996) conditions are satisfied. As we have
discussed in Sect. 5, sustainable recursive social welfare functions are applicable and
yield consequences that differ from those of discounted utilitarianism.
In this final section we note that even wider possibilities open up if we are willing
to give up numerical representability by not imposing RC. In particular, we are then
able to combine the equity condition HEF and the independence condition IP with
our basic conditions O and IF, while strengthening our efficiency conditions M and
RD to condition SP.
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Proposition 13 There exists an swr  satisfying conditions O, IF, SP, HEF, and IP.
The proof of this proposition employs the leximin and undiscounted utilitarian swrs
for infinite streams that have been axiomatized in recent contributions (see, Asheim
and Tungodden 2004a; Basu and Mitra 2007; Bossert et al. 2007).
We end by making the observation that continuity is not simply a “technical” condi-
tion without ethical content. In a setting where RC (or a stronger continuity condition
like C) is combined with RS (or a stronger efficiency condition like SP), it follows from
Proposition 4 that condition HEF is not satisfied. Hence, on this basis one may claim
that, in combination with a sufficiently strong efficiency condition, continuity rules
out swfs that protect the interests of future generations by implying that the equity
condition HEF does not hold. In the main analysis of this paper we have avoided
the trade-off between continuity and numerical representability on the one hand, and
the ability to impose the equity condition HEF on the other hand, by weakening the
efficiency condition in an appropriate way.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Part I: WS implies NDF. Assume that the swr  satisfies
conditions O and WS. By WS, there exist 0x, 0y ∈ X with 1x = 1y such that 0x 	 0y.
Let 0z, 0v ∈ X be given by 0z = 0v = 0x. We have that, for any y, y¯ ∈ Y satisfying y ≤
xt , yt ≤ y¯ for all t ∈ Z+, 0z, 0v ∈ [y, y¯]Z+ . Still, for all T > 0, (0zT−1, T x)= 0x =
(0xT−1, T y) = (0vT−1, T y), implying by O that (0zT−1, T x) ∼ (0vT−1, T y). This
contradicts DF.
Part II: NDF implies WS. Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O and IF.
Suppose that WS does not hold, i.e., for all 0x′, 0y′ ∈ X with 1x′ = 1y′, 0x′ ∼ 0y′.
Case (i): There exist 0x, 0y ∈ X such that 0x 	 0y. Suppose 0x, 0y ∈ X are such
that 0x 	 0y. Let 0z, 0v be arbitrary streams in X. We have that T−1x ∼ (zT−1, T x)
for all T > 0 since WS does not hold. By IF and the above argument,
T−2x = (xT−2, T−1x) ∼ (xT−2, zT−1, T x) ∼ (T−2zT−1, T x).
By invoking O and applying IF and the above argument repeatedly, it follows that
0x ∼ (0zT−1, T x) for all T > 0. Likewise, 0y ∼ (0vT−1, T y) for all T > 0. By O,
(0zT−1, T x) 	 (0vT−1, T y) for all T > 0. This establishes DF, implying that NDF
does not hold.
Case (ii): There do not exist 0x, 0y ∈ X such that 0x 	 0y. Then DF is true
trivially, implying that NDF does not hold in this case either. unionsq
The following lemma is useful for proving Proposition 2 and subsequent results:
Lemma 1 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, and M. Then, for all
0x ∈ X, there exists z ∈ Y such that conz ∼ 0x. If condition RD is added, then z is
unique.
Proof Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, and M. By O, M, and the
definition of X, there exists z ∈ Y such that inf{v ∈ Y | conv  0x} ≤ z ≤ sup{v ∈
Y | conv  0x}. By O and RC, conz ∼ 0x.
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If condition RD is added, then by O, M, and RD we have that
conv = (v, conv)  (v, conz) ≺ conz if v < z, (4)
so that inf{v ∈ Y | conv  0x} = sup{v ∈ Y | conv  0x} and z is unique. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2 Part I: (1) implies (2). Assume that the swr  satisfies con-
ditions O, RC, IF, M, and RD. In view of Lemma 1, determine W : X → Y by, for
all 0x ∈ X, W (0x) = z where conz ∼ 0x. By O and (4), W (0x) ≥ W (0y) if and only
if 0x  0y. By M, W is monotone.
Let U ∈ UI be given by U (x) = x for all x ∈ Y , implying that U (Y ) = Y . Hence,
by construction of W, W (conz) = z = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . It follows from IF that, for
given x0 ∈ Y , there exists an increasing transformation V (U (x0), ·) : Y → Y such
that, for all 1x ∈ X, W (x0, 1x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)). This determines V : Y × Y →
Y , where V (u, w) is increasing in w for given u, establishing that V satisfies (V.2).
By M, V (u, w) is non-decreasing in u for given w, establishing that V satisfies (V.1).
Since (x, conz) ⊀ conv (resp. (x, conz)  conv) if and only if
V (x, z) = V (U (x), W (conz)) = W (x, conz) ≥ v (resp. ≤ v),
RC implies that V satisfies (V.0). Finally, since
V (z, z) = V (U (z), W (conz)) = W (conz) = z
V (x, z) = V (U (x), W (conz)) = W (x, conz) < W (conz) = z if x < z,
by invoking RD, it follows that V satisfies (V.3). Hence, V ∈ V(U ).
Part II: (2) implies (1). Assume that the monotone mapping W : X → R is an swf
and satisfies, for some U ∈ UI and V ∈ V(U ), W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all
0x ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . Since the swr  is represented by the
swf W , it follows that  satisfies O. Moreover,  satisfies M since W is monotone,
 satisfies IF since V satisfies (V.2), and  satisfies RD since U ∈ UI and V satisfies
(V.3). The following argument shows that  satisfies RC:
Let 0x, 0y ∈ X, and let xt = z for all t ≥ 1. Let 0xn ∈ X for n ∈ N, with the
property that limn→∞ supt |xnt − xt | = 0 and, for each n ∈ N, 0xn ⊀ 0y. We have to
show that 0x ⊀ 0y, or equivalently, W (0x) ≥ W (0y). Define 0(n) and (n) for n ∈ N
by, for each n ∈ N, 0(n) := max{0, xn0 − x0} and (n) := max{0, supt≥1(xnt − xt )},
so that limn→∞ 0(n) = 0 and limn→∞ (n) = 0. For each n ∈ N,
V (U (x0 + 0(n)), U (z + (n))) = V (U (x0 + 0(n)), W (con(z + (n))))
= W (x0 + 0(n), con(z + (n)))
≥ W (0xn) ≥ W (0y)
since W is monotone and represents , and 0xn ⊀ 0y. This implies that
W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (conz)) = V (U (x0), U (z)) ≥ W (0y)
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since U and V are continuous and limn→∞ (n) = 0. The same kind of argument can
be used to show that 0x  0y if, for each n ∈ N, 0xn  0y. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 Assume x > y > v > z. We must show under O and M that
each of WHE, WLD, and WPD implies (x, conz)  (y, conv).
Since x > y > v > z, there exist an integer T and utilities x ′, z′ ∈ Y satisfying
y > x ′ ≥ v > z′ > z and x − x ′ = T (z′ − z).
By O (completeness) and WHE, (x ′, z′, conz)  (x, conz), and by M, (y, conv) 
(x ′, z′, conz). By O (transitivity), (y, conv)  (x, conz).
Consider next WLD and WPD. Let 0x0 = (x, conz), and define 0xn for n ∈
{1, . . . , T } inductively as follows:
xnt = xn−1t − (z′ − z) for t = 0
xnt = z′ for t = n
xnt = xn−1t for t = 0, n.
By O (completeness) and WLD, 0xT  0 x0, and by M, (y, conv)  0xT . By O
(transitivity), (y, conv)  (x, conz) since 0x0 = (x, conz).
By O (completeness) and WPD, 0xn  0 xn−1 for n ∈ {1, . . . , T }, and by M,
(y, conv)  0xT . By O (transitivity), (y, conv)  (x, conz) since 0x0 = (x, conz).
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4 This follows from Asheim et al. (2007, Proposition 2). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, M, IF, and
HEF. Let 0x, 0y ∈ X satisfy 0x 	 0y, and let y, y¯ ∈ Y satisfy y ≤ xt , yt ≤ y¯ for all
t ∈ Z+. For any T > 0 with xT−1 > y, Proposition 4 implies that (xT−1, cony) 	
cony would contradict RC and HEF. Since xT−1 ≥ y, it follows from O and M that
(xT−1, cony) ∼ cony for all T > 0. By IF and the above argument,
(T−2xT−1, cony) = (xT−2, xT−1, cony) ∼ (xT−2, cony) ∼ cony
for all T > 1. By invoking O and applying IF and the above argument repeatedly,
(0xT−1, cony) ∼ cony for all T > 0. Likewise, (0yT−1, cony) ∼ cony for all T > 0.
Let 0z, 0v ∈ [y, y¯]Z+ be given by 0z =0v =con y. Since (0xT−1, cony) ∼ cony ∼
(0yT−1, cony) for all T > 0, we have by O that (0xT−1, T z) ∼ (0yT−1, T v) for all
T > 0. This contradicts DP. unionsq
The following result is useful for the proof of Proposition 6.
Lemma 2 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF.
Then, for all 0x ∈ X and T ∈ Z+, T x  T+1x.
Proof Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF. By
the interpretation of T x, it is sufficient to show that 0x  1x. Suppose on the con-
trary that 0x 	 1x. By Lemma 1, there exist z0, z1 ∈ Y such that conz0 ∼ 0x and
conz
1 ∼ 1x, where by O, M, and 0x 	 1x, it follows that z0 > z1. Furthermore, since
1x ∼ conz1, it follows by IF that (x0, 1x) ∼ (x0, conz1). Hence, 0x ∼ (x0, conz1).
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If x0 ≤ z0, then,
0x ∼ (x0, conz1) ≺ (x0, conz0) by (4) and condition IF since z1 < z0
 (z0, conz0) = conz0 ∼ 0x by conditions O and M since x0 ≤ z0.
This contradicts condition O, ruling out this case.
If x0 > z0, then, by selecting some v ∈ (z1, z0),
0x ∼ (x0, conz1)  (z0, conv) by conditions O and HEF
since x0 > z0 > v > z1
≺ (z0, conz0) ∼ 0x by (4) and condition IF since v < z0.
This contradicts condition O, ruling out also this case. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 6 Part I: (1) implies (2). Assume that the swr  satisfies con-
ditions O, RC, IF, M, RD, and HEF. By Proposition 2, the swr  is represented by
a monotone swf W : X → R satisfying, for some U ∈ UI and V ∈ V(U ), W (0x) =
V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . It remains to
be shown that V (u, w) = w for u > w, implying that V satisfies (V.3′) and, thus,
V ∈ VS(U ).
Since V (u, w) is non-decreasing in u for given w ∈ U (Y ) and V (u, w) = w for
u = w, suppose that V (u, w) > w for some u, w ∈ U (Y ) with u > w. Since U ∈ UI ,
the properties of W imply that there exist x, z ∈ Y with x > z such that
W (x, conz) = V (U (x), W (conz)) = V (U (x), U (z))
= V (u, w) > w = U (z) = W (conz).
Since the swr  is represented by the swf W , it follows that (x, conz) 	 conz. This
contradicts Lemma 2.
Part II: (2) implies (1). Assume that the monotone mapping W : X → R is an
swf and satisfies, for some U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ), W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x))
for all 0x ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . By Proposition 2, it remains to be
shown that the swr , represented by the swf W , satisfies HEF. We now provide this
argument.
Let x, y, z, v ∈ Y satisfy x > y > v > z. We have to show that (x, conz) 
(y, conv), or equivalently, W (x, conz) ≤ W (y, conv). By the properties of W ,
W (x, conz) = V (U (x), W (conz)) = V (U (x), U (z)) = U (z) < U (v)
= V (U (y), U (v)) = V (U (y), W (conv)) = W (y, conv),
since x > y > v > z, U ∈ UI , and V ∈ VS(U ). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 7 Fix U ∈ UI and V ∈ VS(U ). The proof has two parts.
Part I: limT→∞W (T x) = lim inf t→∞U (xt ). Assume that the monotone mapping
W : X → R satisfies W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z)
for all z ∈ Y . Hence, by Proposition 6, the swf W represents an swr  satisfying O,
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RC, M, RD, IF, and HEF. By Lemma 1, for all 0x ∈ X, there exists z ∈ Y such that
conz ∼ 0x. By Lemma 2, W (t x) is non-decreasing in t .
Step 1: limt→∞ W (t x) exists. Suppose W (τ x) > lim supt→∞ U (xt ) for some τ ∈
Z+. By the premise and the fact that U ∈ UI , there exists z ∈ Y satisfying
W (τ x) ≥ U (z) > lim supt→∞U (xt )
and T ≥ τ such that z > v := supt≥T xt . By RD, O, and M, conz 	 (v, conz)  T x,
and hence, by O, conz 	 T x. However, since W (t x) is non-decreasing in t, W (T x) ≥
W (τ x) ≥ U (z). This contradicts that W is an swf. Hence, W (t x) is bounded above
by lim supt→∞ U (xt ), and the result follows since W (t x) is non-decreasing in t .
Step 2: limt→∞ W (t x) ≥ lim inf t→∞ U (xt ). Suppose
limt→∞W (t x) < lim inf t→∞U (xt ).
By the premise and the fact that U ∈ UI , there exists z ∈ Y satisfying
limt→∞W (t x) ≤ U (z) < lim inf t→∞U (xt )
and T ≥ 0 such that z < v := inf t≥T xt . By O, M, and RD, conz  (z, conv) ≺
conv  T x, and hence, by O, conz ≺ T x. However, since W (t x) is non-decreasing in
t, W (T x) ≤ limt→∞ W (t x) ≤ U (z). This contradicts that W is an swf.
Step 3: limt→∞ W (t x) ≤ lim inf t→∞ U (xt ). Suppose
limt→∞W (t x) > lim inf t→∞U (xt ).
By Lemma 1, there exists, for all t ∈ Z+, zt ∈ Y such that conzt ∼ t x. Since
U ∈ UI , z ∈ Y defined by z := limt→∞ zt satisfies U (z) = limt→∞ W (t x). By the
premise and the fact that U ∈ UI , there exists x ∈ Y satisfying
lim inf t→∞U (xt ) < U (x) < U (z)
and a subsequence (xtτ , ztτ )τ∈Z+ such that, for all τ ∈ Z+, xtτ ≤ x < ztτ . Then
conz
tτ ∼ tτ x = (xtτ , tτ +1x)  (x, conztτ+1)  (x, conz),
since zt is non-decreasing in t . By O, RC, and the definition of z, conz  (x, conz).
Since x < z, this contradicts RD.
Part II: Existence. Let 0x ∈ X. This implies that there exist y, y¯ ∈ Y such that, for
all t ∈ Z+, y ≤ xt ≤ y¯. For each T ∈ Z+, consider {w(t, T )}Tt=0 determined by (1).
Step 1: w(t, T ) is non-increasing in T for given t ≤ T . Given T ∈ Z+,
w(T, T + 1) = V (U (xT ), w(T + 1, T + 1))
≤ w(T + 1, T + 1) = lim inf t→∞U (xt ) = w(T, T )
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by (1) and (V.3′). Thus, applying (V.2), we have
w(T − 1, T + 1) = V (U (xT−1), w(T, T + 1))
≤ V (U (xT−1), w(T, T )) = w(T − 1, T ).
Using (V.2) repeatedly, we obtain
w(t, T + 1) ≤ w(t, T ) for all t ∈ {0, ..., T − 1},
which establishes that w(t, T ) is non-increasing in T for given t ≤ T .
Step 2: w(t, T ) is bounded below by U (y). By (1), (V.1), (V.2), and (V.3′),
w(T, T ) = lim inf t→∞ U (xt ) ≥ U (y), and for all t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1},
w(t + 1, T )≥U (y)⇒w(t, T ) = V (U (xt ), w(t + 1, T ))≥V (U (y), U (y))=U (y).
Hence, it follows by induction that w(t, T ) is bounded below by U (y).
Step 3: Definition and properties of Wσ . By steps 1 and 2, limT→∞ w(t, T ) exists
for all t ∈ Z+. Define the mapping Wσ : X → R by (W). We have that Wσ is mono-
tone by (1), (V.1), and (V.2). As w(0, T ) = V (U (x0), w(1, T )) and V satisfies (V.0),
we have that Wσ (0x) = V (U (x0), Wσ (1x)). Finally, if 0x = conz for some z ∈ Y , then
it follows from (1) and (V.3′) that w(t, T ) = U (z) for all T ∈ Z+ and t ∈ {0, ..., T },
implying that Wσ (0x) = U (z). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 8 Suppose there exists a monotone mapping W : X → R sat-
isfying W (0y) = V (U (y0), W (1y)) for all 0y ∈ X and W (conz) = U (z) for all
z ∈ Y such that W (0x) = Wσ (0x). Since V satisfies the property of weak time
perspective, there is a continuous increasing transformation g : R → R such that
|g(W (0x)) − g(Wσ (0x))| =  > 0, and furthermore, |g(W (t x)) − g(Wσ (t x))| =
|g(V (U (xt ), W (t+1x)))− g(V (U (xt ), Wσ (t+1x)))| ≤ |g(W (t+1x))− g(Wσ (t+1x))|
for all t ∈ Z+. It now follows, by induction, that
|g(W (T x)) − g(Wσ (T x))| ≥  > 0
for all T ∈ Z+. However this contradicts that, for all T ∈ Z+,
limT→∞W (T x) = lim inf t→∞U (xt ) = limT→∞Wσ (x)
by Proposition 7, since g is a continuous increasing transformation. unionsq
For the proofs of the results of Sect. 4, the following notation is useful, where
0z = (z0, 1z) = (z0, z1, 2z) ∈ X is a fixed but arbitrary reference stream:
x0 z0 y0 means (x0, 1z)  (y0, 1z)
1x 1z 1y means (z0, 1x)  (z0, 1y)
(x0, x1) 0z1 (y0, y1) means (x0, x1, 2z)  (y0, y1, 2z)
2x 2z 2y means (z0, z1, 2x)  (z0, z1, 2y)
x1 z1 y1 means (z0, x1, 2z)  (z0, y1, 2z).
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Say that z0 is independent of 0z if, for all 0x, 0y, 0z, 0v ∈ X, x0 z0 y0 if and
only if x0 v0 y0, and likewise for 1
z, 0z1, 2z, and z1. In this notation and termi-
nology, condition IF implies that 1z is independent of 0z, while condition IP states
that 0z1 is independent of 0z. The following result due to Gorman (1968b) indicates
that imposing condition IP is consequential.
Lemma 3 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions IF and IP.
Then z0, 1
z, 0z1, 2z, and z1 are independent of 0z.
Proof Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions IF and IP. By repeated application
of IF, 1z and 2z are independent of 0z, while IP states that 0z1 is independent of
0z. By IF, (x1, 2z)  (y1, 2z) is equivalent to (z0, x1, 2z)  (z0, y1, 2z), which,
by IP, is equivalent to (z0, x1, 2v)  (z0, y1, 2v), which in turn, by IF, is equiv-
alent to (x1, 2v)  (y1, 2v), which finally, by IF, is equivalent to (v0, x1, 2v) 
(v0, y1, 2v), where 0v ∈ X is some arbitrary stream. Hence, z0 and z1 are indepen-
dent of 0z.
unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 Part I: This part is proved in three steps.
Step 1: By Lemma 3, IF and IP imply that z0 is independent of 0z.
Step 2: By condition WS, there exist 0x, 0y, 0z ∈ X such that x0 	z0 y0. This rules
out that x0 = y0, and by M, x0 < y0 would lead to a contradiction. Hence, x0 > y0.
Since z0 is independent of 0z, this implies RS.
Step 3: By Proposition 4, there is no swr  satisfying RC, RS, and HEF.
Part II: To establish this part, consider dropping a single condition.
Dropping IP. Existence follows from Theorem 1 since RD implies WS.
Dropping HEF. Existence follows from Propositions 9 and 10.
Dropping WS. All the remaining conditions are satisfied by the swf  being rep-
resented by the mapping W : X → R defined by W (0x) := lim inf t→∞xt .
Dropping M. All the remaining conditions are satisfied by the swf  being repre-
sented by the mapping W : X → R defined by W (0x) := −x0 + lim inf t→∞xt .
Dropping IF. All the remaining conditions are satisfied by the swf  being repre-
sented by the mapping W : X → R defined by W (0x) := min{x0, x1}.
Dropping RC. Existence follows from Proposition 13 since SP implies M and WS.
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 9 The proof is based on standard results for additively separable
representations (Debreu 1960; Gorman 1968a; Koopmans 1986a), and is available at
http://folk.uio.no/gasheim/srswfs2.pdf unionsq
Proof of Proposition 10 Available at http://folk.uio.no/gasheim/srswfs2.pdf unionsq
Proof of Proposition 11 Assume that the swr  satisfies conditions O, RC, IF, M,
IP, and NDF. By Proposition 1, O, IF, and NDF imply WS. Hence, by Propositions
9 and 10, the swr  is represented by Wδ : X → R defined by, for each 0x ∈ X,
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for some U ∈ U and δ ∈ (0, 1). This implies DP, thus contradicting NDP. unionsq
The proof of Proposition 12 needs some preliminaries. A sustainable recursive
SWF W : X → R is given, with W (0x) = V (U (x0), W (1x)) for all 0x ∈ X and
W (conz) = U (z) for all z ∈ Y . A utility stream 0u is associated with a feasible path
0k from k ∈ [0, k¯] if ut = U (x( f (kt ) − kt+1, kt )) for t ≥ 0. Write u∗ ≡ U (x∗) =
U (x(c∗, k∗)) = U (x( f (k∗) − k∗, k∗)).
Write S := {(c, k) ∈ [0, k¯] | x(c, k) = x∗}. Since S = ∅, we can define
I = {k ∈ (0, k¯] | there is some c ≥ 0 satisfying (c, k) ∈ S}.
Note that k∗ ∈ I . Let k ∈ I ; then there is c ≥ 0 such that x(c, k) = x∗. Now, let
k′ ∈ I satisfy k′ > k. Then x(c, k′) ≥ x(c, k) = x∗, while x(0, k′) ≤ x(0, k¯) =
x( f (k¯) − k¯, k¯) ≤ x∗. Thus, by continuity of x, there is some c′ ≥ 0, such that
x(c′, k′) = x∗. This shows that I is a sub-interval of (0, k¯], containing [k∗, k¯].
Define, for each k ∈ I , the set φ(k) = {c ≥ 0 | (c, k) ∈ S}. By definition of
I, φ(k) is non-empty for each k ∈ I . Since k ∈ I implies k > 0, φ(k) is a singleton
by property (3)(ii) of the function x . Thus, φ is a function from I to R+, and by
definition, x(φ(k), k) = x∗ for all k ∈ I , so c∗ = φ(k∗). By property (3)(ii), φ is
non-increasing on I .
Lemma 4 For every k ∈ [k∗, k¯], there exists a feasible resource path, 0kˆ, from k
where the associated well-being stream, 0xˆ, satisfies W (t xˆ) = W (conx∗) for t ≥ 0.
Proof Let k ∈ [k∗, k¯], and consider the resource path 0kˆ defined by
k0 = k, kt+1 = f (kt ) − φ(kt ) for t ≥ 0.
Note that, if kt ∈ [k∗, k¯], then
k¯ ≥ f (k¯) ≥ f (kt ) − φ(kt ) ≥ f (kt ) − φ(k∗) = f (kt ) − [ f (k∗) − k∗] ≥ k∗.
Hence, kt+1 ∈ [k∗, k¯] and, by induction, kt ∈ [k∗, k¯] for t ≥ 0. This shows that 0kˆ is
feasible from k ∈ [k∗, k¯]. By the definition of φ(·), xt = x(φ(kt ), kt ) = x∗ for t ≥ 0.
unionsq
Lemma 5 Let 0kˆ be a feasible resource path from k ∈ [0, k¯] with associated utility
stream, 0u. Given any ε > 0, there is some T ≥ 0 such that uT < u∗ + ε.
Proof Suppose, on the contrary, there is some ε > 0, such that ut ≥ u∗ + ε for all
t ≥ 0. By continuity of U, there is δ > 0, such that whenever x ∈ Y and |x − x∗| < δ,
we have |U (x)−U (x∗)| < ε. Thus, we must have |xt − x∗| ≥ δ for all t ≥ 0. Further,
since U is an increasing function, we must have xt ≥ x∗ +δ for all t ≥ 0. This implies
x( f (kt ) − kt+1, kt ) = x(ct , kt ) > x∗ for all t ≥ 0.
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Since x( f (kt ) − kt , kt ) ≤ x∗, property (3)(ii) implies that kt+1 < kt for all t ≥ 0.
Thus, 0k must converge to some κ ∈ [0, k¯]. The continuity of f and x then imply that
x( f (κ) − κ, κ) ≥ x∗ + δ, and this contradicts the definition of x∗. unionsq
Lemma 6 Let 0kˆ be a feasible resource path from k ∈ [0, k¯] with associated well-
being stream, 0xˆ. Then, we have W (0xˆ) ≤ W (conx∗).
Proof Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exist k ∈ [0, k¯] and a feasible
resource path, 0kˆ, from k where the associated well-being stream, 0xˆ, satisfies W (0xˆ) >
W (conx∗) = U (x∗) = u∗. Denote by 0uˆ the associated utility stream (i.e., uˆt = U (xˆt )
for t ≥ 0). Since W (t xˆ) is non-decreasing in t , and is bounded above by U (x(k¯, k¯)) (by
the properties of a sustainable recursive swf), it converges to some ω ≤ U (x(k¯, k¯)).
Hence, ω ≥ W (0xˆ) > u∗. Since the aggregator function V satisfies (V.3′), we must
have V (u∗, ω) < V (ω, ω) = ω. Using the continuity of V , we can find ε > 0 such
that
V (u∗ + ε, ω) < V (ω, ω) = ω. (5)
Write θ := ω − V (u∗ + ε, ω). By (5), θ > 0.
Choose T ∈ Z+ large enough so that for all t ≥ T, W (t xˆ) ≥ ω − (θ/2). By
Lemma 5, uˆt < u∗ + ε for some t ≥ T . Let τ be the first period (≥ T ) for which
uˆt < u
∗ + ε. Then,
ω − θ2 ≤ W (τ xˆ) = V (uτ , W (τ+1xˆ))
≤ V (u∗ + ε, W (τ+1xˆ)) ≤ V (u∗ + ε, ω) = ω − θ < ω − θ2 ,
which is a contradiction. unionsq
Lemma 7 If a feasible resource path, 0kˆ, from k ∈ [0, k¯] has an associated well-being
stream, 0xˆ, which satisfies W (0xˆ) = W (conx∗), then (i) xˆt ≥ x∗ for all t ≥ 0; and (ii)
kˆt ≥ k∗ for all t ≥ 0.
Proof Assume that a feasible resource path, 0kˆ, from k ∈ [0, k¯] has an associated well-
being stream, 0xˆ, which satisfies W (0xˆ) = W (conx∗). Since W (t xˆ) is non-decreasing
in t , it follows from Lemma 6 that W (t xˆ) = W (conx∗) = u∗ for all t ≥ 0.
To establish (i), suppose, by way of contradiction, that xˆt < x∗ for some t ≥ 0.
Then, since U (xˆt ) < U (x∗) = u∗, (V.3′) implies
u∗ = W (t xˆ) = V (U (xˆt ), u∗) < V (u∗, u∗) = u∗,
which is a contradiction.
To establish (ii), suppose, on the contrary, that kˆτ < k∗ for some τ ≥ 0. Then, by
the fact that x( f (k) − k, k) < x∗ if k = k∗, we have x( f (kˆτ ) − kˆτ , kˆτ ) < x∗, while:
x∗ ≤ xˆτ = x(cˆτ , kˆτ ) = x( f (kˆτ ) − kˆτ+1, kˆτ ).
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So, kˆτ+1 < kˆτ < k∗, and repeating this step, kˆt+1 < kˆt for all t ≥ τ . Thus, 0kˆ must
converge to some κ ∈ [0, k¯], with κ ≤ kˆτ < k∗. The continuity of f and x then
implies that
x( f (κ) − κ, κ) ≥ x∗
using (i). But, this contradicts that x( f (k) − k, k) < x∗ if k = k∗. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 12 Lemmas 4 and 6 establish existence of an optimum and that
any optimal well-being stream satisfies W (t xˆ) = W (conx∗) for t ≥ 0. Lemma 7
shows that any optimal resource path 0kˆ, with associated well-being stream 0xˆ, satis-
fies xˆt ≥ x∗ and kˆt ≥ k∗ for t ≥ 0. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 13 Asheim and Tungodden (2004a), Basu and Mitra (2007), and
Bossert et al. (2007) define different incomplete leximin and undiscounted utilitarian
swrs, each of which is given an axiomatic characterization. Denote by  one such
incomplete swr. It can be verified that  is reflexive, transitive and satisfies IF, SP,
HEF (with (x, conz)  (y, conv) if x > y > v > z), and IP. Completeness (and
thereby condition O) can be satisfied by invoking Arrow’s (1951) version of Szpilrajn’s
(1930) extension theorem (see also Svensson 1980).
Since  satisfies conditions SP and HEF (with (x, conz)  (y, conv) if x > y >
v > z), so will any completion. Since, for all 0x, 0y, 0z ∈ X, (x0, x1) 0z1 (y0, y1)
or (x0, x1) 0z1 (y0, y1), and  satisfies IP, so will any completion. However, special
care must be taken to ensure that the completion satisfies IF.
Consider X20 = {(0x, 0y) ∈ X2 | x0 = y0}, and invoke Arrow’s (1951) version
of Szpilrajn’s (1930) extension theorem to complete  on this subset of X2. For any
(0x, 0y) ∈ X with 0x = 0y, let 0x be at least as good as 0y if and only if T x is at least
as good as T y according to the completion of  on X20, where T := min{t |xt = yt }.
Since  satisfies IF, this construction constitutes a complete swr satisfying IF. unionsq
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